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Introduction
2
31 Introduction
Foreign aid is a highly contentious issue. Th roughout its modern history since 
the Second World War, there have been varying views on whether, how, for 
what and by whom foreign aid should be delivered. Th ese views have been in-
fl uenced by the evolution of development thinking, on the one hand, and by the 
evolution of geopolitics and the motives behind aid giving, on the other hand 
(Kanbur 2006; Hjertholm and White 2000; Th orbecke 2000). 
Th e evolving role of aid and the increasingly sophisticated tools available to 
assess aid eff ectiveness motivate why economists have returned to this subject 
repeatedly. A central theme of this thesis is whether changes in how aid is given 
matter for the intended impacts. Th e essays relate to many themes and methods 
in the economic literature on foreign aid. Th e fi rst essay is on the allocation 
and impact of general budget support (GBS), and builds on the literature on 
aid allocation and the macroeconomic impacts of aid on volatility and growth. 
Th e second essay uses an agency model to analyse the consequences of introdu-
cing new, reformed ways of giving aid, such as GBS, in parallel with traditional 
project aid. Th is essay uses analytical tools from the contract-theoretic litera-
ture. Th e third essay is a quasi-experimental evaluation of a rural development 
project in southern Mozambique, and the fourth is an experimental evaluation 
on the relative impacts of receiving cash versus food transfers in eastern Niger. 
Th ese two relate to the microeconomic literature on programme evaluation and 
food security. Th e fi rst of the pair also relates to the literature on technology 
adoption in agriculture, and the second to tools of social protection program-
mes. 
In the reminder of this introductory chapter, I will provide a brief history 
of foreign aid to illustrate how aid delivery has evolved and discuss why aid 
eff ectiveness is such a challenging issue. Th is also provides a motivation for 
the thesis. In section 1.2, I review the literature on aid eff ectiveness, especially 
paying attention to themes relevant for the thesis. Th is spans the literature on 
the theory of aid eff ectiveness, and the macro- and microeconomic literature 
on the eff ects of aid. In section 1.3, the essays of the thesis are briefl y presented. 
1.1 A brief history of foreign aid and the new aid agenda 
Foreign aid is defi ned by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) to be offi  cial fi nancial fl ows to developing countries with 
the promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective, and 
which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent. 
Offi  cial development assistance (ODA) fl ows comprise contributions of donor 
government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries and to multilate-
ral institutions. ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and 
4multilateral institutions (OECD Glossary of statistical terms).  
Foreign aid fl ows can mostly roughly be classifi ed as either project or pro-
gramme aid. Project aid is defi ned as funds provided to implement a specifi c 
and predefi ned set of development activities over a specifi ed period of time 
(Bandstein 2007). Th e forms of programme aid have shift ed over the decades 
but can be divided into two main categories: fi nancial programme aid and food 
programme aid. Th e Marshall Plan aft er the Second World War was largely pro-
gramme aid. In the 1950s, food programme aid was already given and in the 
1960s, sector programme lending existed to some extent. However, it was not 
until the 1980s that fi nancial programme aid became a signifi cant modality1 
(Mosley and Eeckhout 2000).
Refl ecting the dominant view in the 1950s and 1960s that the development 
problem essentially was a problem of lack of capital, foreign aid consisted of 
large scale infrastructure projects in power, transport and telecommunications. 
During these decades, bilateral donors dominated. In the 1970s, the focus tur-
ned to anti-poverty projects focusing on agriculture, rural development and 
social services directly benefi tting the poor (Th orbecke 2000). In the 1980s, the 
growing debt problem in the developing countries aft er decades of borrowing, 
combined with higher interest rates and recessions in the creditor countries 
changed aid dramatically. Th is new form of aid came in diff erent shapes with 
strong conditionalities attached: in the form of structural adjustment lending 
from the World Bank, in the form of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Fa-
cility from the IMF and in the form of balance of payment support from bi-
lateral donors (Mosley and Eeckhout 2000).2 Th e importance of multilaterals 
grew during this period. As a consequence of the strong belief in marked-based 
adjustments and the rolling back of the state in the 1980s, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and the private sector became central actors in imple-
menting project aid, a trend that continued into the 1990s. 
In the early 1990s, a reorientation of the adjustment related programme aid 
began. Th e 1990s can be described as a decade of aid fatigue with a large disil-
lusion of the achievements of aid (Th orbecke 2000). Th ere was a perception 
that inappropriate aid modalities had become part of the problem in aid-de-
pendent countries. Th is was related, on one hand, to a growing awareness of the 
fragmentation that project aid had caused in aid-dependent countries and, on 
the other, to a discussion on whether the structural adjustment programmes in 
the 1980’s and early 1990s in fact had been eff ective. Was it really possible to 
use aid to buy good policies or was it only fuelling corruption? Donors conver-
ged on the idea that good governance was a prerequisite for aid eff ectiveness. 
During the same period, the end of the cold war downplayed the strategic 
reasons for aid giving. Several international initiatives emerged to increase the 
eff ectiveness of aid. While the process started already in early 1990s, it is fair 
1 In what follows programme aid will refer to financial programme aid.
2 For historical overviews of foreign aid, see Thorbecke (2000) and Hjertholm and White 
(2000).
5to say that it gained pace in the early 2000s only. Th e fi rst initiative was the 
OECD/DAC Development Assistance Manual: DAC Principles of Eff ective Aid 
in 1992, emphasising cooperation between donors and a larger involvement 
of the benefi ciaries (Bandstein 2007). In parallel to this, an international con-
sensus emerged to form a comprehensive debt relief mechanism, the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Country initiative, to selected poor countries based on good po-
licies (Bandstein 2007). In 2000, agreed outcomes were formulated in the Mil-
lennium Development Goals, accompanied by accelerated international eff ort 
to harmonize and align development assistance around national policies and 
strategies as formulated in national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Th e Pa-
ris Declaration on aid eff ectiveness was signed by more than 100 development 
organisations and countries in 2005. It was followed up in the Accra High Level 
Forum (HLF) 2008 and in Busan HLF 2011.
While there is a degree of rhetoric in this process, the content of the aid 
agenda emerging from this process lies in increased recipient country owner-
ship of their development process, increased harmonisation of donor activities 
and greater commitment to eff ectiveness and obtaining results (Bourguignon 
and Lepziger 2006). In practice, this aid agenda has been refl ected in a par-
tial move away from traditional project aid and strongly conditional program-
mes. Donors have tended to move from ex ante conditionality to ex post con-
ditionality, meaning that aid is conditioned on the obtained level of policies 
rather than on promises of improvement (Collier 2007). Bilateral donors and 
international fi nancial institutions, instead of primarily running their own pro-
jects and priorities separately, are supposed to increasingly deliver aid through 
sector wide approaches (SWAPs) or directly to partner country budgets in the 
form of general budget support (GBS).3 Multi-donor interactions with partner 
governments are replacing bilateral ones and dialoguing is taking place in sec-
toral or cross-cutting task forces. 
Also, the nature of project aid has to some extent changed. Th ere is a ten-
dency to organise individual interventions under larger frameworks, such as 
social protection, moving from stand-alone projects to programmes. NGOs and 
UN organisations are increasingly serving as implementers and facilitators of 
government programmes. 
Th e strong focus on governance and policy selectivity has been modifi ed in 
recent years. If foreign aid mainly is to be channelled to relatively well governed 
countries, it means that it will, in fact, bypass most poor people (Collier 2007). 
Aft er all, countries are oft en poor precisely because they are badly governed. 
Th is new focus on fragile states is also refl ected in the World Development Re-
port 2011 (World Bank 2011). Th e new consensus seems to be that aid should 
not bypass fragile states but that aid modalities have to be adopted according to 
the country situation.     
Whether intentions to increase aid eff ectiveness actually do increase aid ef-
3 A SWAP is an organising framework for sector level development in which different aid mo-
dalities - such as sector budget support and basket funds - can be used.
6fectiveness is an open question. Optimists would argue that the new aid para-
digm is a step forward. In the words of Bourguignon and Leipziger (2006, p. 
16), “the international aid architecture is now supportive of successful outcomes”. 
Sceptics would argue that aid is so politicised and that there are so many fun-
damental problems inherent to foreign aid that reforms will not make aid more 
eff ective (Moyo 2009; Easterly 2006; Killick 2004). 
1.1.1 Th e challenge of measuring aid eff ectiveness
The role of aid in development is a theme that economists have returned to 
repeatedly with increasingly sophisticated tools. Economists have a lot to say 
about aid eff ectiveness and why foreign aid might succeed or fail. A focus in 
the empirical literature over the last decade has been to take the question of 
causality seriously. Th is originates in the programme evaluation literature at the 
micro level and has its background in a concern about reliable causal identifi ca-
tion, but has probably gained pace from a policy call for more evidence based 
aid. Now also macroeconomic questions on the impact of aid have been tackled 
with inspiration from the programme evaluation literature (see, for example, 
Arndt et al 2010).  
While the tools are improving, the questions at hand are complex, making 
it diffi  cult to reach conclusive results. First, foreign aid is given with diff erent 
motives and for a wide range of purposes. Th e motives range from altruistic 
ones to political, military and commercial interests, the purposes from humani-
tarian disaster relief, peace-keeping, fi ght against terrorism, support to expand 
markets of private enterprises in donor country and promotion of culture or 
language, to various developmental objectives, mostly with the long-term aim 
to reduce poverty (Bourguignon and Leipziger 2006). Th us the question as to 
whether aid works has many interpretations and eff ects might not be picked 
up by indicators that economists typically use, such as, economic growth or 
human development. 
Second, the causality chain is complex and it is not obvious what the appro-
priate time frame is for measuring results (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007). 
Some types of aid have mostly short-term eff ects, such as humanitarian assis-
tance, while other types, such as aid to health or education, might have more 
long-term eff ects with some impacts showing up with a long time-lag. Identifi -
cation of impacts has to deal with issues such as endogenous selection, hetero-
geneous treatment responses and mismeasurement of treatment input (Arndt 
et al 2010). Randomised experiments can ease the severity of these issues for 
well-defi ned questions at the micro-level. Still, understanding the causal me-
chanisms is challenging. Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) take child immu-
nisation as an example. To determine whether an additional child being vac-
cinated is due to an immunisation aid project, improved health care, additional 
funding for the health care system, or something else, is next to impossible. 
Finally, the perspective matters. It is not diffi  cult to fi nd studies that point to 
7positive results of aid at the micro level. However, the macro level literature is 
far more ambiguous. Th is suggests that there are distortions and spill-over ef-
fects created by foreign aid that cannot be captured by micro-level evaluations. 
Mosley (1987) referred to this phenomenon as the micro-macro paradox.  
1.2 Overview of literature and methods
In this section, I review the literature on aid eff ectiveness, especially paying at-
tention to parts relevant for the thesis. Th is spans the macroeconomic literature 
on aid, the theory of incentives in aid, and the empirical microeconomic litera-
ture on the eff ects of aid. Th e question as to whether aid works must necessarily 
be accompanied by the question why this is or is not the case. Roughly spea-
king, mechanisms that aff ect aid eff ectiveness can take place on three levels: 
in the recipient country, in the donor-recipient relationship and in the donor 
country (Paul 2006). Th is literature is so large that a comprehensive survey is 
not feasible. I will focus on the infl uential but thorny literature on aid and eco-
nomic growth, on the main theoretical discussions on aid and incentives, and 
the fairly recent development on the microeconomic side, using randomised 
trials to evaluate aid. Th e literature that is specifi c to the individual essays will 
mainly be reviewed within them. Since some of the literature has had signifi -
cant impact on policy, I will discuss the literature in the light of this.     
1.2.1 Aid eff ectiveness in the macroeconomic literature
It is fair to say that the discussions on the macroeconomic eff ects of aid have 
been dominated by the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth. 
Th e original macroeconomic rationale for foreign aid is that it can help add-
ressing gaps in savings and trade by supplementing domestic savings, foreign 
exchange and government revenue (Hjertholm et al 2000). Th e theoretical un-
derpinning for this view is the Harrod-Domar growth model, in which physical 
capital formation is the central driving force behind economic growth. Th is 
view has later been modifi ed, both because of empirical experience and ad-
vances in the literature. Beyond fi lling saving and trade gaps, there are several 
complicating factors at play, making the macroeconomic eff ects of aid com-
plex. Th ese include the eff ects of aid on government behaviour, debt problems 
created by aid and Dutch disease eff ects (Hjertholm et al 2000). Dutch disease 
eff ects are to say that large infl ows of foreign currency may lead to currency ap-
preciation, making the export sector less price competitive. As discussed below, 
some of these channels have also been explored to explain the aid − growth 
relationship, or more specifi cally, why aid does not necessarily have the growth 
eff ects that simple growth models would predict.
Aid can aff ect government behaviour by infl uencing government expendit-
ure and fi nancing patterns. Th is line of literature includes the literature on aid 
8fungibility, that is, how aid frees up resources elsewhere for the government 
(e.g. Singer 1965; Pack and Pack 1993; Feyzioglu et al 1998; McGillivray and 
Morrissey 2000; Petterson 2007; Van den Sijpe 2012) and the fi scal response 
literature (eg. Heller 1975; Mosley et al 1987; White 1993; McGilliray 2000 
Gupta et al 2004; Mavrotas and Ouattara 2007; Cassimon and van Campenhout 
2007). Problems related to political economy in government behaviour compli-
cates issues further. Th is literature ascribes poverty to government failure and 
weak institutions. Foreign aid interferes with the domestic political process and 
may aggravate distortionary polices for the benefi t of a local elite (Boone 1996; 
Adam and O’Connell 1999; Svensson 2000a).  
Th e debt literature is vast including, issues such as debt capacity (e.g. Feder 
et al 1981; McDonald 1982), debt and economic performance (Warner 1992; 
Cohen 1993) and debt relief (Krugman 1998; Cohen 2001; Hepp 2005). Th e 
Dutch disease problem has been studied by e.g. van Wijnbergen (1985), Young-
er (1992), Nyoni (1998), and Rajan and Subramanian (2005). 
Numerous studies have been undertaken on the aid − growth relationship, 
ranging from early studies based on the Harrod-Domar growth model to more 
recent ones inspired by modern growth theory (Hansen and Tarp 2000). Howe-
ver, as the contradictory results from this literature shows, the relationship bet-
ween aid and growth is not easy to establish. Th e shortcomings of the general 
empirical literature on economic growth, including problems such as parame-
ter heterogeneity, outliers, omitted variables, model uncertainty, measurement 
errors and endogeneity, have been widely acknowledged (Rodrik 2005) (see for 
example Durlauf et al 2004; Easterly 2004). 
Before reviewing the results of this literature, it can be helpful to ask what 
kind of relationship we should expect to find between aid and growth. This 
question is addressed by e.g. Rajan and Subramanian (2008). Th e point of de-
parture of the authors is that aid primarily should work by increasing public 
investment. Using a standard Solow-Swan growth model and taking the most 
optimistic scenario when all aid is invested rather than consumed, would yield 
a regression coefficient of 0.16. That is, a 1 percentage point increase in the 
ratio of aid to GDP would raise the long-run growth rate by 0.16 percent. As-
suming that some aid is wasted or consumed, a regression coeffi  cient of around 
0.1 is to be expected. While this is a rough benchmark, it is nevertheless useful 
in the discussion of diff erent studies. One implication of this small coeffi  cient is 
that noise in the data may make it hard to establish a relationship even when it 
exists (Rajan and Subramanian 2008).
In the literature on aid and growth, three main results are cited and debated 
(Clemens et al 2012; Arndt et al 2010; Bourguignon and Lepziger 2006; Kan-
bur 2006). Th e fi rst is a result pointing to conditional aid eff ectiveness, saying 
that aid has a positive eff ect on growth, but only in certain contexts. Th e most 
infl uential study – also from a policy perspective - is that of Burnside and Dol-
lar (2000). Th e authors fi nd that aid causes growth in countries that maintain 
9low infl ation, do not run large budget defi cits and are open to trade. Th e point 
estimate evaluated at a ‘good’ policy level is in the range of 0.6-0.7. A number 
of studies, with slightly diff erent specifi cations and defi nitions of good insti-
tutions or policies, followed suit, including Collier and Dehn (2001), Guillau-
mont and Chauvet (2001), Collier and Dollar (2002) and Collier and Hoeffl  er 
(2004). However, results pointing to policy conditionality have been shown to 
be sensitive to outliers, and extensions of the data (Easterly 2003; Easterly et al 
2004; Roodman 2007).          
A second result points to an unconditional positive impact of aid on growth 
but with diminishing returns. Here the most infl uential study is that of Hansen 
and Tarp (2001), but also Lensink and White (2001) reach similar results. Al-
lowing for non-linearity in the aid − growth relationship by including aid squa-
red, Hansen and Tarp (2001) do not fi nd any support for the fi nding that aid 
only aff ects growth in good policy environments. However, when investment 
and human capital are included in the regression, aid has no positive eff ect on 
growth. Th is is taken as a sign that aid aff ects growth via capital accumulation 
so this relationship is further investigated. Th e authors fi nd that in a majority of 
aid recipients there is a one-to-one link between aid and investments. In other 
words, the positive aid − growth relationship is explained by the aid − invest-
ments link. 
Finally, there are studies pointing to a ‘null result’, that is, no signifi cant rela-
tionship between aid and growth, particularly Rajan and Subramanian (2008), 
but also earlier and infl uential results by Boone (1996). Th e theoretical fram-
ework in Boone’s (1996) paper argues that aid failure is related to political-
economy problems that will depend on political regimes. Th e empirical results 
do not suggest that aid eff ectiveness varies according to whether the recipient 
governments are democratic or repressive, however. Regardless of regime, aid 
appears to increase consumption rather than being used for investments. 
In one companion paper to Rajan and Subramanian (2008), the null result 
is explained by Dutch disease effects (Rajan and Subramanian 2005) and in 
another by eff ects on governance (Rajan and Subramanian 2007). In the fi rst 
paper, the authors fi nd that in countries that receive more aid, labour-intensive 
and exportable sectors grow slower than capital-intensive and non-exportable 
sectors. Th ey also fi nd a positive correlation between aid and overvaluation of 
the real exchange rate. Th e authors conclude that even if aid is delivered with 
the best intentions and used responsibly by recipient governments, there are 
adverse impacts on competitiveness that in turn off -sets positive impacts on 
growth. In the second paper, they test if aid reduces the quality of governance. 
Th e point of departure is that poor governance might aff ect growth in manu-
facturing. Th ey test if countries that receive more aid see diff erent growth rates 
in governance sensitive industries. Th e fi nding is that the growth rates in such 
industries are signifi cantly aff ected by aid in a negative direction.
Both the conditional literature and the null-result literature argue that go-
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vernance is at work in the aid − growth relationship. In the first mentioned 
literature, aid does not aff ect governance but has a positively signifi cant eff ect 
on growth in countries with relatively good governance. In the null result lite-
rature, aid has a negative eff ect on governance and thus no eff ect on growth. 
Th e results from the macro literature seem perhaps daunting given its diver-
se fi ndings, but are not surprising given the nature of the aid − growth relation-
ship, as discussed above. Th is endogenous relationship has almost exclusively 
been addressed with instrumental variables such as political ties, lagged aid 
fl ows or size of the recipient country (Clemens et al 2012). However, concerns 
have been raised that these instrument are either so weak that the estimates are 
biased towards their unadjusted counterparts, or invalid (Clemens et al 2012; 
Arndt et al 2010).
Th e most recent literature has attempted to fi nd new ways out of these di-
lemmas. A recent contribution is that by Clemens et al (2012), that reanalyses 
data from Boone (1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000), and Rajan and Subra-
marian (2008). Th ey claim that the failure to consider the time lag with which 
aid might aff ect growth, poor-quality instruments and inappropriate aid con-
cepts have caused inconclusive and contradictory results. Instead of treating 
aid as one single resource, the authors use an aid concept that they call “early 
impact aid”. Th ey remove aid fl ows that are not intended to aff ect productive 
capacity, such as humanitarian assistance or donor’s administrative / overhead 
costs, and aid fl ows that might aff ect growth with a very long time lag, such as 
investments in the social sector. By using fi rst-diff erencing to remove eff ects 
of time invariant omitted variables, and adding time lags, the authors fi nd that 
the results across the studies are similar: “… aid causes some degree of growth in 
recipient countries, although the magnitude of this relationship is modest, varies 
greatly across recipients and diminishes at high levels of aid”. Th e magnitude is 
around 0.1-0.2 percentage point in growth of real GDP per capita.
There are also other attempts to move the literature forward. Arndt et al 
(2010) take inspiration from the programme-evaluation literature and estimate 
the average treatment eff ect of aid on growth using an extended doubly-robust 
estimator. Th is estimator combines an inverse probability weighting estimator, 
which uses propensity scores to estimate treatment eff ects, with a linear regres-
sion to control for covariates. Th e authors fi nd a positive relationship between 
aid and growth. Th e point estimate of the long run elasticity of growth with 
respect to the share of aid in recipient GDP is 0.13 using their most preferred 
strategy. 
Th e direction of the literature is likely to be in the spirit of Clemens et al 
(2012) and Arndt et al (2010), that is, disaggregating aid fl ows and taking inspi-
ration from the programme evaluation literature. In their comment of an ear-
lier version of the Clemens et al paper, Mavrotas and Nunnekamp (2007) and 
Bourguignon and Leipziger (2006) call for more studies that disaggregate aid 
fl ows. Th e former authors note that the level of aggregation in the data still is 
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fairly high in Clemens et al and that it subsumes diff erent aid categories. Bour-
guignon and Leipziger (2006) conclude that disaggregating aid fl ows “appear to 
be a promising line of investigation”. Why has not this been undertaken earlier? 
One reason, probably the main one, is that aid data have been of notoriously 
bad quality, with major diff erences in donor reporting. Th is is starting to chan-
ge, but researchers still have to accept to work with very short time series in 
order to have reliable data, which is problematic given the earlier discussion on 
aid impact and time frames. Another is fungibility issues, which is to say that 
it does not really matter how aid is given as it frees up resources elsewhere for 
the government. 
Why has the focus in the macro literature been so much on aid and growth 
rather than aid and poverty? Ultimately, most aid programmes strive to reduce 
poverty. An important answer lies in data availability. Comparable data on po-
verty rates are simply not there for a suffi  cient number of countries and years. 
Still, growth is not necessarily a good proxy for poverty reduction. On the other 
hand, growth is in most contexts a prerequisite for poverty reduction, even if 
not all growth reduces poverty (Shepherd and Bishop 2013). Poverty can de-
crease because of reductions in inequality, but ultimately the resources for re-
distribution have to come from growth. Macro- and meso studies have to some 
extent been undertaken on outcomes related to poverty reduction. Th ere are 
studies on aid and infant mortality (Masud and Yontcheva 2005; Mishra and 
Newhouse 2007; Pettersson 2007), aid and the MDGs (Th iele et al 2007), and, 
aid and public service delivery (Wolf 2007) to mention a few. 
1.2.2 Aid and incentives
Foreign aid involves a large number of actors: taxpayers in the donor country, 
donor and recipient governments, bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, in-
ternational fi nancial institutions, line ministries and agencies in the recipient 
country, civil society organisations, implementation partners and benefi cia-
ries. Between the taxpayers in the donor country and the intended recipients 
there is therefore a chain of delegation involving actors with potentially very 
diff erent objectives. Th e donor may care about the poor, but also wants the aid 
to be attributable to its own activities (Knack and Rahman 2007). Th e recipi-
ent country may care about the poor, but also answer to its own constituency 
and interest groups (Svensson 2006). Th e aid agency may also care about the 
poor, but also has the maximisation of the aid budget as one of its objectives 
(Knack and Rahman 2007). Th at is, actors will optimise given the incentives 
and constraints that they face. If incentives are not aligned, the outcomes might 
be quite far from what was intended. Also, those who pay for the aid and those 
who are supposed to benefi t from it live in diff erent countries with diff erent 
political constituencies (Martens et al 2001).
While the theoretic models on aid eff ectiveness are diverse, the incentive 
problems in aid are at the core of the literature. Delegating a task to someone 
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with potentially diff erent objectives than the principal, and whose actions are 
not completely observed by the principal is one source of incentive problems. 
Th is act of delegation, involving confl icting objectives and decentralized in-
formation, create two types of informational or agency problems: those on ac-
tions (moral hazard) and those on the characteristics of the actors (adverse 
selection) (Laff ont and Martimort 2002). However, also motivational problems 
may arise in any collective-action situation (Ostrom et al 2002). Such problems 
arise when there is inadequate motivation to contribute to the production of 
joint benefi ts even with complete information, for example, the production of 
public goods. In fact, poverty alleviation in itself can be considered as a public 
good (Torsvik 2005). In the aid context, these motivational and informational 
problems may be encountered at many levels: on the level of the citizens, in the 
policy processes of both donor and partner countries, in the relationships be-
tween donors and partners and within aid agencies themselves. 
Th e donor-recipient relationship has resulted in a large theoretical literature. 
Much of this literature is contract-theoretic (Svensson 2000b; Svensson 2003; 
Azam and Laff ont 2003; Bourguignon and Platteau 2011), some underlying the 
non-contractibility in donor-recipient relationships (Murshed and Sen 1995; 
Pedersen 2001; Torsvik 2005; Murshed 2009) and some incorporating institu-
tional features (Ostrom et al 2001; Martens et al 2002).
Th e issue from a contract-theoretic perspective is, on the one hand, to write 
eff ective contracts under asymmetric information, and on the other, to make 
these contracts credible given the incentives present in aid (Azam and Laff ont 
2003). The basic contract-theoretic answer to the aid effectiveness problem 
seems straightforward – if aid is conditioned on the consumption of the poor, it 
is more eff ective than if it is unconditional (Kanbur 2006). Donor-driven proj-
ects and conditional aid are manifestations of attempts from the donor side to 
resolve the agency problem (Kanbur et al 1999). But for the contract between 
the donor and the recipient to be credible, donors must withhold aid if the 
conditions are not met. However, as documented by numerous studies, condi-
tionality is not enforced (Killick 1997; Collier 1997; World Bank 1998; Kanbur 
2000; Dollar and Svensson 2000; Svensson 2003). For example, Svensson (2003) 
studies 200 structural adjustment programmes and fi nds that disbursements 
were uncorrelated with whether or not the recipient government had imple-
mented the agreed reforms.
Th is indicates that the situation is more complicated than what the simple 
principal-agent framework between the donor and recipient government sug-
gests (Kanbur 2006). Solutions to the aid-eff ectiveness problem are far more 
challenging when considering the incentives in the aid-delivery process where-
by aid money keeps fl owing despite of reform eff orts. 
The commitment problem of the donor is modelled in Svensson (2000b, 
2003). He analyses a two-stage game in which the recipients choose their re-
form eff orts in the fi rst period. Given the outcomes in the second period, the 
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donor choses the amount of aid to disburse. Since the donor is driven by altru-
ism, it disburses aid despite of reform eff orts. In anticipation of this, the recipi-
ents have little incentives to carry out reforms in the fi rst period. Th is problem 
is oft en referred to as the Samaritan’s dilemma and was fi rst formulated by Bu-
chanan (1977). In this game, the highest pay-off  for the Samaritan occurs when 
giving aid regardless of the effort of the recipient, while the highest pay-off 
for the recipient occurs when exerting low eff ort. One solution that Svensson 
(2000b) proposes is to delegate aid to an agency with less poverty aversion to 
assure that aid conditionality is enforced. Another is to separate the allocation 
and disbursement decision by committing aid to a group of countries and dis-
burse aid depending on their relative performance (Svensson 2003).
A seemingly straightforward prescription to the conditionality problem – 
put forward by for example Azam and Laff ont (2003) – is that donors simply 
should avoid giving aid to badly governed countries. Th is solution has been 
reinforced by the infl uential results in the empirical literature, which I reviewed 
above, saying that aid only has a positive effect on growth in countries that 
are relatively well governed. But not only that. Also the new aid agenda which 
emphasizes country ownership over their development process and the need 
to reduce the role of conditionalities and donor attempts to buy reform tend 
to favour relatively well-governed countries (Bourguignon and Platteau 2011). 
Since conditional aid does not seem to work, some studies suggest that donors 
should move from conditionality to country selectivity (see for example Collier 
1997; Azam and Laff ont 2003). However, what this prescription disregards is 
that most poor people live in fragile states (Collier 2007). 
Th is trade-off  between needs and governance has been modelled explicitly 
by Bourguignon and Platteau (2011). Th eir model goes beyond earlier analysis 
by making it possible for the donors to make decisions regarding the precision 
of monitoring and the degree of punishment. Th e donors are thereby able to in-
fl uence the quality of governance in recipient countries. Th e authors show that 
if monitoring and punishment eff orts can be country-specifi c, so that the donor 
chooses to concentrate its monitoring eff orts on the worst-governed countries, 
then both richer and poorer countries will receive aid. However, aid to the best-
governed countries will cost less. If the monitoring and punishment eff orts on 
the other hand are uniform, then a wider range of scenarios are possible. Th e 
lesson is that if the aid-delivery parameters are tailored to the governance situ-
ation in the recipient countries, then the interests of the poor are best assured. 
Some authors point out that the aid eff ectiveness problem cannot properly 
be understood with models that assume enforceable contracts. Murhsed (2009) 
also underlines the importance of departing from models where poverty allevi-
ation is the sole motivation for aid giving. Th is is the case in Murshed and Sen 
(1995), who characterise the non-cooperative interaction between donors and 
recipients in a model of double moral hazard. Th e double moral hazard comes 
about since the eff ort level of the recipient is not known by the donor and the 
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action of the donor is not known by the recipient. Th e model is applicable to 
situations where donors promote diff erent confl icting actions, creating moral 
hazard in their own behaviour. Donors promote disarmament at the same time 
as they are tying aid projects to arms sales causing insuffi  cient action by them-
selves to promote demilitarization. Non-cooperative behaviour on both sides 
results in aid being used in a non-eff ective way. Th e cooperative equilibrium 
under complete information would be Pareto-optimal but is infeasible given 
informational constraints and the absence of a global institution to enforce co-
operation.     
In his paper on the effects of donor cooperation, Torsvik (2005) stays in 
the world of altruistic donors but doubts that enforceable contracts are avail-
able. In this situation, can donors gain anything from cooperation or is the 
recipient able to strategically exploit the poverty aversion of the donors? Th e 
point of departure in the paper is two potentially countervailing features of aid 
in the presence of many donors. On one hand, poverty alleviation becomes a 
public good which would lead to under-provision of aid under non-coopera-
tion. On the other hand, cooperation between donors might intensify incentive 
problems in the recipient country and crowd out domestic support to the poor. 
Torsvik (2005) show that, in a simultaneous move game where the recipients 
cannot strategically exploit the donors’ altruism, the crowding-out problem 
is intensifi ed and cooperation is not benefi cial for the donors. In a sequential 
game, however, where the Samaritan’s dilemma is present, cooperation is ben-
efi cial, since it makes donors less responsive to changes in domestic transfers. 
Th is mitigates the crowding-out eff ect of aid. Th e analysis of Torsvik (2005) 
shows that outcomes can become quite diff erent when the donor-recipient in-
teraction is assumed to be non-contractible. Under enforceable contracts, do-
nor cooperation would always unambiguously be benefi cial. Without contracts, 
however, the benefi ts of donor cooperation become less obvious.           
Some branches of the institutional literature tackle the aid effectiveness 
problem in a slightly diff erent way. While using principal-agent models as a 
tool, this literature also considers the institutions surrounding complex prin-
cipal-agent relationships and motivational issues that arise in collective-action 
situations. According to this literature aid eff ectiveness can only be understood 
if the analysis goes beyond the relationship between the donor and recipient 
governments. When aid fails, it is the result of the incentives in diff erent parts 
of the aid delivery chain and concerns both donors and recipients (Ostrom et al 
2002; Martens et al 2002). It takes away the focus from recipient-country per-
formance only, to incentives in the aid delivery process.  
Martens et al (2001) point out that the nature of foreign aid is character-
ised by the nature of public administrations combined with a unique feature of 
foreign aid: the intended benefi ciaries of foreign aid are not the same as those 
who pay for it and thus they have no political leverage. Meanwhile, tax-payers 
in the donor country do not benefi t from the tangible results of foreign aid, 
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nor are they able to observe them. Common agency and multiple competing 
tasks that characterise public administrations typically lead to weaker incentive 
contracts and lower eff orts by the agent (Holmström and Milgrom 1990, 1991; 
Dixit 1996). Th e broken feedback loop in foreign aid induces strong incentive 
biases in aid delivery on tasks that are easily monitored (Seabright 2001). Th is 
leads to, among other things, a disproportionate focus on the volume of aid, 
both in public discussions and within aid organisations. 
Th is literature gives an additional dimension to the Samaritan’s dilemma. 
Th e reason for why this game is being played lies in the presences of institu-
tional problems on both the donors and the recipient side (Ostrom et al 2002). 
On the donor side, the problem of aid budget maximisation results in a situa-
tion where the ultimate goal is to keep aid money fl owing. Imposing long-term 
sanctions due to violation of terms is simply not in the interest of aid agencies. 
Th e problem on the recipient side relates to that of missing or weak institu-
tions: if the leading offi  cials are interested in private gain and institutions to 
prevent this are weak or missing, the risk that this game is being played is high. 
Further, the availability of aid results in moral hazard since it creates incen-
tives for governments to postpone reforms and weakens their incentives to take 
ownership of the development process. When this game is repeatedly being 
played the donors may be creating a situation where the recipient’s skills and 
motivation fall over time. 
Th e reading of the theoretic literature on aid eff ectiveness shows the com-
plexity of the issues and highlight why aid eff ectiveness is not easily achieved 
despite of good intentions. When all actors optimise given the incentives and 
constraints that they face, the fi nal outcome might be far from what was in-
tended. 
1.2.3 Randomised experiments in the micro-economic research on 
 aid eff ectiveness
Randomised experiments have become widely used in development economics, 
also in the evaluation of aid at the micro-level. Th is has its background in a 
concern about reliable identifi cation of causal eff ects in the presence of com-
plex and multiple channels of causality, but also, from a policy perspective, in 
a call for more evidence-based aid (Banjeree and Dufl o 2009). In their review 
of developments in programme evaluation, Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) 
point out that some of the most interesting and innovative experiments in re-
cent years have been conducted in development economics. Th e deworming 
study in Kenya by Miguel and Kreamer (2004), the flipchart study – also in 
Kenya – by Glewwe et al (2004) and the study of women as policy makers in 
Indonesia by Dufl o and Chattopadhyay (2004) are classical examples of some 
early studies. 
While some experiments have been carried out on nation-wide program-
mes, such as the conditional cash transfers programmes PROGRESA/Oppor-
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tunidades in Mexico and Bolsa Familia in Brazil, most experiments are carried 
out in collaboration with small NGOs. Th is seems perhaps a bit paradoxical in 
the face of the aid eff ectiveness agenda, calling for less focus on individual pro-
jects. Th is is no coincidence, however. Th e randomisation movement is not just 
about methodological improvements in project evaluations, but about a whole 
diff erent view of what development means. Its primary advocates do not believe 
in universal answers to development questions and one-size-fi ts-all solutions. 
In order to learn what works and what does not, it is necessary to shift  from 
broad questions to narrower ones. According to this view, incremental progress 
is the only way forward (Banerjee and Dufl o 2011).                                                                                                                                  
Th e discussion on the pros and cons of randomised trials in the evaluation 
of aid is not purely scientifi c but mainly focussed on feasibility and learning 
(see for example Banjeree 2007; Ravallion 2008; Rodrik 2008). While there 
might be worries about compliance and contamination, most researchers would 
agree that experimental studies, in cases when they are feasible, are the gold 
standard when it comes to internal validity. 
However, the enthusiasm around randomised experiments has led some re-
searchers to warn against potential pitfalls. Although experimental researchers 
are able to provide reliable results, they might measure eff ects that are not of 
any real interest (Ravallion 2008). Diff erently put, there is a risk that there is 
too much focus on identifi cation rather than on asking meaningful questions 
that emerge from our knowledge gap. Also, experiments are as “soft ” as other 
types of evidence when it comes to the real questions at hand (Rodrik 2008).
Banjeree and Dufl o (2009) and Heckman (1992) discuss some methodologi-
cal issues in experimental research. Concerns raised against experimental stu-
dies include environmental dependence, that is, without assumptions, results 
from experiments cannot be generalised beyond their context or even beyond 
their implementing organisation. Critics also argue that locations where ex-
periments take place are not chosen randomly. Replication studies can coun-
teract this concern. For example, the conditional cash transfer programme 
PROGRESA/Opportunidades in Mexico has been replicated and evaluated in 
several other Latin-American countries, with broadly similar results (Banjeree 
and Dufl o 2009). 
A second major issue is that of partial or general equilibrium eff ects. Th is 
includes on the one hand eff ects that an intervention might have due to spill-
over eff ects that are not properly captured by the evaluators, and, on the other 
hand, eff ects that an intervention would have if it was scaled up. Th is takes us 
back to the micro-macro dilemma referred to earlier. Some studies that evalua-
te market equilibrium eff ects include Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) on the eff ects 
of a school voucher programme in Chile and Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) on 
human capital externalities. 
Th e criticisms against experimental research have not passed unnoted. Th e 
strong emphasis on assumption-free inference that characterised the early lite-
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rature appears to have taken a step back. One direction of the literature seems 
to be to introduce more assumptions and use experimental data in structural 
models (Banjeree and Dufl o 2009). In other words the research seems to go in 
a direction where the experimental design is viewed to be helpful in relaxing 
concerns about selection eff ects. A similar development can be noted in rela-
tion to theory. While theory is not needed for identifi cation of basic eff ects, the 
results can still be used to inform theory. One example put forward by Banjeree 
and Dufl o (2009) is that of demand theory. Several independent evaluations 
suggest that the elasticity of demand for health protection products, such as 
deworming drugs or bed nets, is extremely elastic, especially around zero. Th is 
points to some type of hyperbolic preferences rather than the types of preferen-
ces predicted by standard economic theory.
1.3 Overview of essays, data collection and results 
In this section, I present the essays of the thesis. I provide a short motivation 
for them, describe the data collection and review the results. 
1.3.1 Th e fi rst essay: General budget support as an aid instrument 
 – allocation and impact
The first essay, co-authored with Kaisa Alavuotunki, studies general budget 
support (GBS) as an aid instrument from a cross-country perspective. It is con-
cerned with both the use and allocation pattern of this modality and some early 
impacts. Th is is in line with the recommendations of Bourguignon and Leipzi-
ger (2006, p.16) stating that “Disaggregating aid fl ows…appears to be a promi-
sing line of investigation” and the recent work of Clemens et al (2012) referred 
to above. 
Assembling reliable data was an important part of the study. Due to incon-
sistent reporting of aid modalities in the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) data 
of OECD-DAC, we used several other sources. The move towards new pro-
gramme based modalities has been monitored in the Paris declaration monito-
ring survey (PDM) undertaken by the OECD. Th e baseline data from this mo-
nitoring are from 2005 and follow-up data from 2007 and 2010. Cross checking 
the CRS-data with the Paris declaration monitoring survey (PDM), national 
data and operations data from multilateral institutions revealed many incon-
sistencies in the reporting. Th is concerned especially the PDM survey where 
the defi nition of ‘direct budget support’ was loose, leading donors – eager to 
portraying themselves in a good light – to over-report budget support disbur-
sements. As a result of this data exercise, we have fairly reliable data on GBS for 
the years 2005, 2007 and 2010. Our descriptive results show that only a small 
number of countries receive a substantial part of their aid allocations in the 
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form of GBS, indicating that donors use this modality sparingly. 
Taking year 2000 as the treatment year, we examine if (i) changes in aid 
allocation patterns can be identifi ed since the introduction of GBS, (ii) what 
the characteristics are of countries receiving the modality, (iii) if aid volatility 
has decreased, and (iv) if any growth impacts can be identifi ed due to the use 
of GBS. We find a structural break in aggregate aid allocations between the 
late 1990s and 2000s. Th e importance of recipient needs has increased and do-
nor commercial interests decreased, but results on recipient merits are mixed. 
Compared to other aid, GBS is allocated to poorer countries with a history of 
high indebtedness, stronger recipient merits and stronger political ties as mea-
sured by former colonial status. Th e volatility of aid shows a statistically signi-
fi cant decrease between the 1990s and 2000s, but is not found to be a specifi c 
characteristic of the GBS recipients. Th e growth performance of GBS recipients 
has outperformed that of non-recipients, but these results are sensitive to exclu-
ding some of the top recipients. 
Our results point to a partial move towards the new aid model discussed 
above. Th is concerns both the extent to which GBS is used as well as the alloca-
tion patterns. Th e reluctance of donors to move to these modalities comes as no 
surprise, given the incentives present in aid.  
1.3.2 Th e second essay: Th e use of budget support and project aid in parallel  
 – an agency analysis
Th e second essay, co-authored with Johan Willner, analyses the consequences 
of introducing new, reformed ways of giving aid, such as GBS, in parallel with 
traditional project aid. Th is is done within the conceptual framework of a prin-
cipal-agent model. Th e motivation for the paper lies in the partial move to new 
forms of aid, as a consequence of the new aid paradigm, while also maintaining 
more traditional approaches. We examine the consequences of this phenome-
non. We are concerned with how the agency problems related to diff erent aid 
modalities aff ect eff ort levels, wages and output in the production of a good at 
the sector level in an aid receiving country.  
Most of the literature has analysed either the use of budget support or pro-
ject aid but not their parallel use (see, for example, Cordella and Dell’Arriccia 
2007 and Jelovac and Vandeninden 2008). We examine the eff ect of the parallel 
use on the production of a good at the sector level in an aid receiving country. 
We do this in a model with two principals, namely the donor and the central 
government of the recipient country. With project aid, donors fund a project 
directly at the sector level, whereas the aid funds are channelled through the 
central government, which decides about their use, in the case of budget sup-
port. Th e two groups of agents are on one the hand those hired to work for the 
donor projects and on the other hand the civil servants hired by the central 
government. We have a situation in mind where the leading employees/civil 
servants can have diff erent qualifi cations, or more precisely where the diff erent 
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funding channels can attract civil servants with diff erent disutility of eff ort. Be-
cause of less donor control, it is reasonable to assume that risks are higher in 
budget support. As a consequence, a parameter that refl ects the severity of the 
agency problems is higher in the case of budget support. 
We fi nd that more severe agency problems under budget support might fa-
vour the use of project aid, unless the recipient country is strongly oriented 
towards development, and/or possible long-run impacts of budget support are 
taken into consideration. Combining the use of the two modalities is usually 
not optimal, save for some special circumstances. While more severe agency 
problems would suggest higher wages under budget support, we actually fi nd 
reasonable conditions under which the wages under project aid are higher. Th is 
helps explain why project aid might attract the most productive civil servants 
and may therefore result in low eff ort levels in activities fi nanced by budget 
support. 
While the donor agency do maximise the output in the recipient country, 
distortions on the donor side may come about through the fact that it only has 
limited ability to decide on the proportion of budget support versus project aid. 
Th is refl ects the fact that the allocation decision will be driven by forces that are 
partly exogenous to the model. Th is is a consequence of the multiple motiva-
tions that donors have for giving aid.
1.3.3 Th e third essay: Technology adoption and food security in subsistence  
 agriculture: Evidence from a group-based aid project in Mozambique
Th e third essay, co-authored with Milla Nyssölä and Jukka Pirttilä, evaluates 
the impact of an integrated rural development programme on farming techni-
ques and food security in the Gaza area of rural Mozambique. Th e study was a 
part of a larger research project under the name “Th e eff ects of Finnish foreign 
aid on recipient countries’ economic performance, inequality, poverty and well-
being”. Th is larger project was carried out over the years 2007-2010 and was 
funded by the Academy of Finland. Th e aid intervention was carried out by lo-
cal staff  at the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) in Mozambique, but entirely 
funded by the Finn Church Aid. Th e evaluation was carried out in cooperation 
with LWF and the National Health Research Institute of the Ministry of Health 
in Mozambique (NHI). In cooperation with NHI, our research team planned 
the evaluation design, survey instruments and the three rounds of data collec-
tion, 2008-2010. We were also actively involved in both the training and fi eld-
work stages. It is the fi rst study to apply statistical impact-evaluation methods 
to evaluate a project that is a part of the Finnish development cooperation. In 
addition to the present paper, it also resulted in a paper on HIV/AIDS aware-
ness and attitudes by Alavuotunki and Heikkilä (2012). 
Th is essay explores the impacts of the part of the intervention that aimed to 
facilitate the adoption of improved technologies made available by the govern-
ment of Mozambique, but which did not reach the farmers. To improve subsis-
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tence farming yields, the intervention focused on creating groups of farmers, 
training these groups and setting up shared farms as a medium for technology 
transfer, potentially better commitment and benefi ts of social learning.
We use a quasi-experimental approach with data from two treatment villa-
ges and four control villages. We examine the impact of the aid programme on 
people living in the treatment villages, using the diff erence-in-diff erences sta-
tistical approach, and on participants of the farming groups, using instrumen-
tal-variables techniques. Th e outcome variables concentrate on the adoption of 
new farming practices, including the use of improved seeds and fertilisation, as 
well as food security that could partially be a result of the successful adoption 
of these practices. 
Th e results indicate that while participation in farmers’ groups was high, the 
adoption of new technologies was only limited to the fi rst year of the interven-
tion. Th e impacts on farming techniques appear to dissipate in the second aid 
year. While the intervention was successful in encouraging vulnerable hous-
eholds to participate, it appears that it did not succeed in relaxing constraints 
that hinder farmers from taking up new technologies. Th is was particularly the 
case in the second year when the drought got worse in the treatment villages. 
Th e impact on food security is mixed across indicators, but similar in both tre-
atment years. Th us, the results on food security cannot be attributed to whether 
or not households adopted new technologies. Th e fact that those farmers who 
adopted new technologies in the fi rst year dropped them in the second year 
suggests that they were not found to be profi table enough in the face of severe 
drought. Th is is in line with fi ndings from Ghana and Ethiopia where farmers 
switch in and out of fertilizers in response to (expected) profi tability (Dercon 
and Christiaensen 2011; Conley and Udry 2010).
1.3.4 Th e fourth essay: Th e impact of cash and food transfers: Evidence from  
 a randomised intervention in Niger  
Th e fourth essay, co-authored with John Hoddinott and Joanna Upton, assesses 
the relative impact of cash versus food transfers in eastern Niger using a ran-
domised design. Th is study is one of four impact evaluations based on a pilot 
initiative carried out by the UN World Food Programme (WFP), and evaluated 
in collaboration with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).4 
Th e initiative aimed to study the use of cash/vouchers for food assistance by 
generating rigorous evidence on key impacts and costs. Th e evaluation design 
and survey instruments were planned by the authors. Th e authors also under-
took enumerator training. Th e data collection was planned and implemented in 
collaboration with WFP’s country offi  ce in Niger. 
Th is study contributes to fi lling a gap in the literature when it comes to pro-
viding rigorous evidence on the comparative impacts of cash and food transfers 
4 The other studies, all using randomized designs, were undertaken in Yemen, Uganda and 
Ecuador.
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on food security and food related outcomes. Th e intervention took place in 92 
villages eligible for emergency assistance as identifi ed by the government of 
Niger. Due to the nature of the intervention, involving public works, the ran-
domization took place at the worksite level, leaving us with 52 randomization 
units. The project was implemented in two phases over a six month period, 
from April through September 2011. Th e fi rst phase involved public works, and 
the second phase unconditional transfers for the most vulnerable households. 
Th e work requirements were dropped during the second phase out of concern 
that they would interfere with the planting and weeding of crops during the 
agricultural season. Th e fi rst survey was implemented in July, at the conclusion 
of the public works but before the roll-out of the unconditional transfer, and 
the second survey in October at the conclusion of the unconditional transfers. 
Results on food security are available for 2268 households in July and 2209 
households in October.
With respect to the short term food security objectives of this interven-
tion, the food basket had clear advantages. Households in localities randomi-
sed to receive the food basket experienced larger, positive impacts on measures 
of food security and dietary diversity than those receiving the cash transfer. 
One reason that the cash recipients had less diverse diets lies in their choice 
of purchasing grains in bulk, a refl ection of both the extreme poverty found in 
this area and uncertainty regarding future food prices. While these diff eren-
ces held in both periods, other outcomes showed greater variation by season. 
Households receiving food resorted to fewer coping strategies, and this eff ect 
was more pronounced during the height of the lean season (fi rst phase) than 
during the growing season (second phase). Food recipients did not trade their 
transfers to any large extent; less than fi ve percent of food was sold or exchan-
ged for other goods. Households receiving cash spent more money repairing 
their dwellings during the lean season, prior to the start of the rains, but spent 
more on agricultural inputs during the growing season. Both food and cash 
were delivered with the same frequency and timeliness, but the food transfers 
cost 15 percent more to implement. 
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Svensk sammanfattning
Huruvida utvecklingsbistånd är motiverat, i vilken form de ska ges, och till 
vem, är frågor som oft a debatteras. Ett centralt tema i avhandlingen är om nya 
former av utvecklingssamarbete har betydelse för de resultat som eft ersträvas.
Den första uppsatsen är samförfattad med Kaisa Alavuotunki och studerar 
allokeringsmönster och konsekvenser av generellt budgetstöd (GBS) i ett tvär-
snitt av länder över två decennier. Vi studerar (1) om allokeringen av bistånd 
generellt har förändrats eft er införande av GBS, (2) vad som kännetecknar län-
der som erhåller GBS, (3) om biståndets volatilitet har sjunkit eft er införandet 
av GBS och (4) om GBS har påverkat ekonomisk tillväxt. Vi använder ett tredi-
mensionellt datamaterial där kombinationen givare-mottagare-år utgör en ob-
servation. Vi fi nner ett trendbrott i aggregerade biståndsallokeringar mellan år 
1990 och 2000, där mottagarlandets behov har ökat i betydelse och givarländer-
nas kommersiella intressen i sin tur minskat. I jämförelse med andra bistånds-
former ges GBS till fattigare länder, till länder som tidigare varit högt skuldsatta 
och till länder som är relativt välstyrda. Bilaterala givare ger i högre grad GBS 
till sina tidigare kolonier. Biståndets volatilitet har minskat mellan åren 1990 
och 2000 men detta gäller inte endast för länder som mottar GBS. Den ekono-
miska tillväxten i länder som får GBS är något högre än hos icke-mottagare.
Den andra uppsatsen som är samförfattad med Johan Willner granskar 
biståndsproblematiken från ett teoretiskt perspektiv med en principal-agent-
modell. Dessa modeller används bl.a. när man vill studera problem som upp-
kommer vid delegering av uppgift er där parterna kan ha olika mål för verk-
samheten. Vi analyserar konsekvenserna av att parallellt med traditionella 
biståndsformer introducera nya former av bistånd, såsom GBS. Vi studerar hur 
agentproblem i olika former av bistånd påverkar produktivitet, löner och out-
put av en vara på sektornivå (t.ex. hälso- eller utbildningssektorn) i ett land 
som parallellt erhåller olika biståndsformer. Vi utvecklar en modell där pro-
jektbiståndet kanaliseras från givarlandet direkt till sektorerna medan budget-
understödet kanaliseras till mottagarlandets regering som sedan beslutar om 
hur medlen skall användas. Våra resultat visar att större agentproblem i GBS 
tenderar att leda till att givarländerna föredrar projektunderstöd om inte mot-
tagarlandet är mycket reformvänligt eller potentiella långsiktiga eff ekter av GBS 
beaktas. Att kombinera olika biståndsmodaliteter är i regel inte optimalt eft er-
som det leder till lägre output. Högre löner inom projektbistånd lockar de mest 
produktiva tjänstemännen i mottagarlandet och kan därigenom leda till lägre 
produktivitet i aktiviteter som fi nansieras av GBS. Det här kan på lång sikt göra 
att eff ektiviteten av GBS ytterligare urholkas.  
Den tredje uppsatsen som är samförfattad med Milla Nyyssölä och Jukka 
Pirttilä utvärderar eff ekterna på valet av nya jordbruksteknologier och matsä-
kerhet (dvs. adekvat tillgång till mat) av ett utvecklingsprojekt bland självhus-
hållande bönder i Gazaområdet i sydvästra Moçambique under åren 2008-2010. 
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Projektet genomfördes av Lutherska världssamfundet men fi nansierades med 
fi nska biståndsmedel. Syft et med projektet var att lära bönderna att använda 
nya jordbruksteknologier såsom gödsel och nya mer resistenta och produktiva 
grödor som tillhandahålls av Moçambiques myndigheter. Utbildningen i dessa 
nya tekniker gjordes framförallt genom jordbrukargrupper och gemensamma 
provodlingar. Vi studerar i vilken mån dessa de facto används av de geografi skt 
utspridda och avsides belägna jordbrukarna. Studien baseras på data från pro-
jekt- och kontrollbyar. Resultaten visar att interventionen var framgångsrik i att 
få de fattigaste bönderna att delta i jordbrukargrupper, men att bönderna en-
dast det första året av interventionen använde de nya jordbruksteknologierna. 
Huruvida bönderna använde nya teknologier eller inte påverkade inte nämn-
värt deras matsäkerhet. Detta tyder på att de nya teknologier inte uppfattades 
som tillräckligt produktiva för att implementeras då torkan slog till under det 
andra interventionsåret. Att få jordburkare att använda nya teknologier är ut-
manande i fattiga områden där jordbrukare är utsatta för många typer av risker 
(såsom torka och översvämningar) och där tillgång till försäkringar och kredit 
är begränsad. För att en intervention ska vara eff ektiv måste den beakta dessa 
risker och begränsningar.                
 Den fj ärde uppsatsen som är samförfattad med John Hoddinott och Joanna 
Upton, utvärderar de relativa eff ekterna mellan mat- och monetär hjälp på mat-
säkerhet i östra Niger. Interventionen implementerades av FN:s matprogram 
(WFP) för att studera eff ekterna och kostnaderna av olika typer av insatser för 
att förbättra hushållens matsäkerthet. Interventionen gjordes år 2011 i 92 byar 
som enligt Nigers myndigheter var berättigade till humanitär hjälp pga. torka 
och eft erföljande dålig skörd. Interventionen pågick under sex månader och 
var utformad så att hälft en av byarna var slumpmässigt valda att få livsmedel 
(spannmål, olja och bönor) och hälft en att få pengar motsvarande värdet på 
livsmedelskorgen. Resultaten tyder på motsatsförhållanden (trade-off s) mellan 
mat- och penningtransfereringar. Matinterventionen gav bättre matsäkerhet 
på kortsikt men var dyrare att genomföra. De hushåll som fi ck en livsmedels-
korg hade högre matsäkerhet och en mera varierad diet än de som fi ck pengar. 
En orsak till detta var att de hushåll som fi ck pengar nästan uteslutande köpte 
den billigaste typen av livsmedel, d.v.s. spannmål. Mathushållen använde ock-
så färre och mindre förödande överlevnadsstrategier än de som fi ck pengar. 
Hushållen som fi ck pengar använde å andra sidan mer resurser till att reparera 
bostäder och till utrustning och grödor för jordbruk. Detta kan ge högre in-
komster i framtiden.    
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On the Eff ects of New 
Forms of Foreign Aid 
Foreign aid is a highly contentious issue. Through-
out its modern history since the Second World 
War, there have been varying views on whether, 
how, for what and by whom foreign aid should be 
delivered. 
A central theme of the four essays in this volume 
is if changes in how foreign aid is given matter 
for the intended impacts. To what extent do do-
nors use general budget support (GBS) as an aid 
instrument, to whom is it given and do we see 
any early impacts? What happens when donors 
use reformed ways of giving aid in parallel with 
traditional approaches? Is an NGO intervention 
successful in facilitating the take-up of govern-
ment-provided farming techniques among sub-
sistence farmers in Mozambique? Are cash or 
food transfers more eff ective in improving food 
security among households eligible for emergen-
cy assistance in Niger? These are some of the im-
portant questions studied in this volume.
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